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This paper studies a sequential model of multilateral bargaining under majority rule in which legislators make decisions in both private and public good dimensions via an endogenous recognition process. Legislators can expend resources to become the proposer and to make proposals about the allocation of private and public goods. We show that legislators exert unproductive effort to be the proposer and make proposals in both dimensions depending on legislative preferences. Effort choices in equilibrium depend mainly on preferences in both distributional and ideological dimensions as well as the patience level of legislators and the legislature's size. We also show that in a diverse legislature it may be possible to observe distributive policies when the majority of legislators have collective-leaning preferences, or vice versa.

Two of the main proposals for the reform of the European Union (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2011 were related to maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and transferable fishing concessions (TFCs). The European Commission (EC) proposed the goal of achieving MSY for all European fisheries. The EC also proposed implementation of TFCs under some major principles including reserving a part of total quotas for small-scale fishermen in order to prevent the disappearance of small-scale fishing communities in coastal regions. Even though TFCs have not been a major part of the last reform in 2013, we theoretically study what the potential effects of TFCs would be on the achievement process of MSY harvesting conditions under the major principles defined by the EC. We find that the level of reserved quotas for small-scale fishermen does matter since reserving more quotas for small-scale fishermen, using more selective fishing techniques than largescale fishermen, reduces the time needed to achieve MSY.

Two of the main proposals for the reform of the European Union (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2011 were related to maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and transferable fishing concessions (TFCs). The European Commission (EC) proposed the goal of achieving MSY for all European fisheries. The EC also proposed implementation of TFCs under some major principles including reserving a part of total quotas for small-scale fishermen in order to prevent the disappearance of small-scale fishing communities in coastal regions. Even though TFCs have not been a major part of the last reform in 2013, we theoretically study what the potential effects of TFCs would be on the achievement process of MSY harvesting conditions under the major principles defined by the EC. We find that the level of reserved quotas for small-scale fishermen does matter since reserving more quotas for small-scale fishermen, using more selective fishing techniques than largescale fishermen, reduces the time needed to achieve MSY.

We develop a simple theoretic game a model to analyze the relationship between electoral systems and governments' choice in trade policies. We show that existence of international pressure or. foreign lobby changes a government's final decision on trade policy, and trade policy in countries with proportional electoral system is more protectionist than in countries with majoritarian electoral system. Moreover, lobbies pay more to affect the trade policy outcomes in countries with proportional representation systems.

We develop a simple theoretic game a model to analyze the relationship between electoral systems and governments' choice in trade policies. We show that existence of international pressure or. foreign lobby changes a government's final decision on trade policy, and trade policy in countries with proportional electoral system is more protectionist than in countries with majoritarian electoral system. Moreover, lobbies pay more to affect the trade policy outcomes in countries with proportional representation systems.